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7. Privacy Considerations

Privacy considerations, security considerations, and operational considerations from Sections 7-9 are preserved below.

7.  Privacy Considerations

   This section discusses exposure related to DMARC aggregate reporting.

7.1.  Report Recipients

   A DMARC Policy Record can specify that reports should be sent to an
   intermediary operating on behalf of the Domain Owner.  This is done
   when the Domain Owner contracts with an entity to monitor mail
   streams for abuse and performance issues.  Receipt by third parties
   of such data may or may not be permitted by the Mail Receiver's
   privacy policy, terms of use, or other similar governing document.
   Domain Owners and Mail Receivers should both review and understand if
   their own internal policies constrain the use and transmission of
   DMARC reporting.

   Some potential exists for report recipients to perform traffic
   analysis, making it possible to obtain metadata about the Receiver's
   traffic.  In addition to verifying compliance with policies,
   Receivers need to consider that before sending reports to a third
   party.

7.2.  Data Contained Within Reports

   Aggregate feedback reports contain aggregated data relating to
   messages purportedly originating from the Domain Owner.  The data
   does not contain any identifying characteristics about individual
   users.  No personal information such as individual mail addresses, IP
   addresses of individuals, or the content of any messages is included
   in reports.

   Mail Receivers should have no concerns in sending reports, as they do
   not contain personal information.  In all cases, the data within the
   reports relates to the domain-level authentication information
   provided by mail servers sending messages on behalf of the Domain
   Owner.  This information is necessary to assist Domain Owners in
   implementing and maintaining DMARC.

   Domain Owners should have no concerns in receiving reports, as they
   do not contain personal information.  The reports only contain
   aggregated data related to the domain-level authentication details of
   messages claiming to originate from their domain.  This information
   is essential for the proper implementation and operation of DMARC.
   Domain Owners who are unable to receive reports for organizational
   reasons can choose to exclusively direct the reports to an external
   processor.

7.3.  Feedback Leakage

   Providing feedback reporting to Public Suffix Operators (PSOs) for a
   Public Suffix Domain (PSD) [RFC9989] can, in some cases, cause
   information to leak out of an organization to the PSO.  This leakage
   could potentially be utilized as part of a program of pervasive
   surveillance (see [RFC7624]).  There are roughly three cases to
   consider:

   Single Organization PSDs (e.g., ".mil"):
      Aggregate reports based on PSD DMARC have the potential to contain
      information about mail related to entities managed by the
      organization.  Since both the PSO and the Organizational Domain
      Owners are common, there is no additional privacy risk for either
      normal or non-existent domain reporting due to PSD DMARC.

   Multi-organization PSDs requiring DMARC usage (e.g., ".bank"):
      Aggregate reports based on PSD DMARC will only be generated for
      domains that do not publish a DMARC Policy Record at the
      Organizational Domain or host level.  For domains that do publish
      the required DMARC Policy Records, the feedback reporting
      addresses of the Organizational Domain (or hosts) will be used.
      The only direct risk of feedback leakage for these PSDs are for
      Organizational Domains that are out of compliance with PSD policy.
      Data on non-existent domains would be sent to the PSO.

   Multi-organization PSDs not requiring DMARC usage (e.g., ".com"):
      Privacy risks for Organizational Domains that have not deployed
      DMARC within such PSDs can be significant.  For non-DMARC
      Organizational Domains, all DMARC feedback will be directed to the
      PSO if that PSO itself has a DMARC Policy Record that specifies a
      "rua" tag.  Any non-DMARC Organizational Domain would have its
      feedback reports redirected to the PSO.  The content of such
      reports, particularly for existing domains, is privacy sensitive.

   PSOs will receive feedback on non-existent domains, which may be
   similar to existing Organizational Domains.  Feedback related to such
   domains have a small risk of carrying information related to an
   actual Organizational Domain.  To minimize this potential concern,
   PSD DMARC feedback MUST be limited to aggregate reports.  Failure
   reports carry more detailed information and present a greater risk.

8.  Security Considerations

   While reviewing this document and its security considerations, it is
   ideal that the reader also review the Privacy Considerations section
   above, as well as the privacy considerations and security
   considerations in Sections 10 and 11 of [RFC9989].

8.1.  Report Content as an Attack

   Aggregate reports are supposed to be processed automatically.  An
   attacker might attempt to compromise the integrity or availability of
   the report processor by sending malformed reports.  In particular,
   the archive decompressor and XML parser are at risk to resource
   exhaustion attacks (zip bomb or XML bomb).

8.2.  False Information

   The data contained within aggregate reports may be forged.  An
   attacker might attempt to interfere with or influence policy
   decisions by submitting false reports in large volume.  The attacker
   could also be attempting to influence platform architecture
   decisions.  A volume-based attack may also impact the ability for a
   Report Receiver to accept reports from other entities.

8.3.  Disclosure of Filtering Information

   While not specified in this document itself, the availability of
   extensions could enable the report generator to disclose information
   about message placement (Inbox/Spam/etc.).  This is very much
   discouraged as it could relay this information to a malicious party,
   allowing them to understand more about filtering methodologies at a
   receiving entity.

9.  Operational Considerations

9.1.  Report Generation

   *  The error fields should be reasonably terse and usable.

   *  If reports cannot be generated, the system should ideally log a
      useful error that helps troubleshoot the issue.

9.2.  Report Evaluation

   As noted above, if a report does not match the specified format, the
   evaluator will likely find the contents to be in question.
   Alternately, the evaluator may decide to sideline those reports so
   they can more easily collaborate with the report generator to
   identify where the issues are happening.

   It's quite likely that the data contained within the reports will be
   extracted and stored in a system that allows for easy reporting,
   dashboarding, and/or monitoring.  The XML reports themselves are not
   human readable in bulk, and a system such as the above may aid the
   Domain Owner with identifying issues.

9.3.  Report Storage

   Once a report is accepted and properly parsed by the report
   evaluator, it is entirely up to that evaluator as to what they wish
   to do with the XML documents.  For some domains, the quantity of
   reports could be fairly high, or the size of the reports themselves
   could be large.  Once the data from the reports has been extracted
   and indexed, the reports seemingly have little value in most
   situations.