8. Security Considerations

Questa sezione conserva il testo RFC per le SCIM device schema extensions, inclusi Device and EndpointApp resource types, BLE, DPP, Ethernet MAB, FDO, Zigbee, endpointAppsExt, JSON Schema, OpenAPI, IANA registrations e security considerations.

8.  Security Considerations

   Because provisioning operations permit device access to a network,
   each SCIM client MUST be appropriately authenticated.

8.1.  SCIM Operations

   An attacker that has authenticated to a trusted SCIM client could
   manipulate portions of the SCIM database.  To be clear on the risks,
   we specify each operation below.

8.1.1.  Unauthorized Object Creation

   An attacker that is authenticated could attempt to add elements that
   the enterprise would not normally permit on a network.  For instance,
   an enterprise may not wish specific devices that have well-known
   vulnerabilities to be introduced to their environment.  To mitigate
   the attack, network administrators should layer additional policies
   regarding what devices are permitted on the network.

   An attacker that gains access to SCIM could attempt to add an IP-
   based device that itself attempts unauthorized access, effectively
   acting as a bot.  Network administrators SHOULD establish appropriate
   access-control policies that follow the principle of least privilege
   to mitigate this attack.

8.2.  Object Deletion

   Once granted, even if the object is removed, the server may or may
   not act on that removal.  The deletion of the object is a signal of
   intent by the application that it no longer expects the device to be
   on the network.  It is strictly up to the SCIM server and its back
   end policy to decide whether or not to revoke access to the
   infrastructure.  It is RECOMMENDED that SCIM delete operations
   trigger a workflow in accordance with local network policy.

8.3.  Read Operations

   Read operations are necessary in order for an application to sync its
   state to know what devices it is expected to manage.  An attacker
   with access to SCIM objects may gain access to the devices
   themselves.  To prevent one SCIM client from interfering with devices
   that it has no business managing, only clients that have created
   objects or those they authorize SHOULD have the ability to read those
   objects.

8.4.  Update Operations

   Update operations may be necessary if a device has been modified in
   some way.  Attackers with update access may be able to disable
   network access to devices or device access to networks.  To avoid
   this, the same access control policy for read operations is
   RECOMMENDED here.

8.5.  Higher Level Protection for Certain Systems

   Devices provisioned with this model may be completely controlled by
   the administrator of the SCIM server, depending on how those systems
   are defined.  For instance, if BLE passkeys are provided, the device
   can be connected to, and perhaps paired with.  If the administrator
   of the SCIM client does not wish the network to have complete access
   to the device, the device itself MUST support finer levels of access
   control and additional authentication mechanisms.  Any additional
   security must be provided at higher application layers.  For example,
   if client applications wish to keep private information to and from
   the device, they should encrypt that information over-the-top.

8.6.  Logging

   An attacker could learn what devices are on a network by examining
   SCIM logs.  Due to the sensitive nature of SCIM operations, logs
   SHOULD be encrypted both on the disk and in transit.