7. Security Considerations

This section preserves the RFC text for the RAW architecture, including RAW, DetNet, TSN, OAM, PREOF, PLR, PSE, PCE, PDR, SLA, SLO, SLI, recovery graphs, protection paths, LL API, diagrams, tables, and security considerations.

Original RFC Text

7.  Security Considerations

7.1.  Collocated Denial-of-Service Attacks

   RAW leverages diversity (e.g., spatial and time diversity, coding
   diversity, and frequency diversity), possibly using heterogeneous
   wired and wireless networking technologies over different physical
   paths, to increase reliability and availability in the face of
   unpredictable conditions.  While this is not done specifically to
   defeat an attacker, the amount of diversity used in RAW defeats
   possible attacks that would impact a particular technology or a
   specific path.

   Physical actions by a collocated attacker such as a radio
   interference may still lower the reliability of an end-to-end RAW
   transmission by blocking one segment or one possible path.  However,
   if an alternate path with diverse frequency, location, and/or
   technology is available, then RAW adapts by rerouting the impacted
   traffic over the preferred alternates, which defeats the attack after
   a limited period of lower reliability.  Then again, the security
   benefit is a side effect of an action that is taken regardless of
   whether or not the source of the issue is voluntary (an attack).

7.2.  Layer 2 Encryption

   Radio networks typically encrypt at the Media Access Control (MAC)
   layer to protect the transmission.  If the encryption is per pair of
   peers, then certain RAW operations like promiscuous overhearing
   become impractical.

7.3.  Forced Access

   A RAW policy typically selects the cheapest collection of links that
   matches the requested SLA, e.g., use free Wi-Fi versus paid 3GPP
   access.  By defeating the cheap connectivity (e.g., PHY-layer
   interference) the attacker can force an End System to use the paid
   access and increase the cost of the transmission for the user.

   Similar attacks may also be used to deplete resources in lower-power
   nodes by forcing additional transmissions for FEC and ARQ, and attack
   metrics such as battery life of the nodes.  By affecting the
   transmissions and the associated routing metrics in one area, an
   attacker may force the traffic and cause congestion along a remote
   path, thus reducing the overall throughput of the network.